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In his report to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation in the beginning of 1992,
President Boris Yeltsin stated that one of the fundamental principles of his foreign policy
was the integration of Russia into the ‘community of civilized states’. However, joining a
society or community of some kind requires the fulﬁlment of certain standards. The ﬁrst
global application of international norms and expected standards of behaviour took place
during the nineteenth century through the process of the expansion of the European so-
ciety of states and its gradual transformation to the contemporary global international
society. In this process, the standard of ‘civilization’ played an essential role in determining
which states would join the expanding European society and which ones would not.
Despite its ofﬁcial repudiation, the standard of ‘civilization’ has remained an international
practice as well as a benchmark against which the attitudes and policies of states are
assessed. This paper examines the changes that the Russian Government under President
Yeltsin had to introduce in order to achieve the country's admission into post-Cold War
international society. It argues that these changes included the democratization of the
Russian political system, the transformation of the Russian economic system into a free
market economy, and the de-ideologisation of the Russian foreign policy.
Copyright © 2015, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is twofold: ﬁrst, to utilize the
theoretical framework of the English School of Interna-
tional Relations in order to analyse Russia's relations with
the West from 1991 to 1994; and second, to provide anarch Center, Hanyang
nter, Hanyang University. Prodempirical contribution to the literature on international
society by highlighting the existence and applicability of
contemporary standards of ‘civilization’, which despite
their formal repudiation play a signiﬁcant role in the post-
Cold War international society.
One of the major themes of the English School research
agenda has been the expansion of the historical European
society of states and its gradual transformation into the
contemporary global international society (Bull & Watson,
1984; Watson, 1992). Research in this area has revealed
that Europe has traditionally been deﬁned in terms ofuction and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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forged in contrast to a number of ‘others’ (Neumann, 1999;
Neumann &Welsh, 1991; Sakwa, 2011: 197). In the process
of the evolution of the European international society,
Russia, together with Turkey, has served as Europe's
constitutive ‘other’ (Aalto, 2007; Neumann, 1995; 2008).
Among other things, this is the reason that explains why
Russia has developed an ambivalent relationship with
Europe and, as an extension, with the West. In addition, it
has been argued that Russian conceptions of order played
an important role in the development of international so-
ciety through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and
that the relationship between Russia and Europe has been
historically troubled by serious tension between Russian
andWestern conceptions of order and justice. (MacFarlane,
2003: 177).
One of the major questions that classical English School
scholars addressed was: how did extra-European states
achieve membership of the expanding European interna-
tional society? As a result, scholarly efforts were under-
taken to investigate Russia's entry into the European
society of states. (Bull & Watson, 1984; Gong, 1984;
Neumann, 2011; Stivachtis, 1998). Thus, a considerable
body of literature exists that would help one to understand
Russia's current approach to global order.
In the process of the European expansion, the standard
of ‘civilization’ played an essential role in determining
which states would join the expanding European interna-
tional society and which ones would not (Gong, 1984). In
the post-colonial era, the standard of ‘civilization’ came to
be viewed as part of an unjust system of domination and
exploitation. However, while the old standard of ‘civiliza-
tion’ fell into disrepute, new possible successors have risen
in contemporary international society (Millennium, 2014).
But if the old standard of ‘civilization’ has constituted an
unacceptable international practice then, by the same
token, any new standards of ‘civilization’ should be criti-
cally approached and rethought albeit their contribution to
the creation and maintenance of a global order. Although
its author is critical to the use of concepts such as ‘civilized
states’, it is not the purpose of the paper to directly address
their legitimacy and acceptability. Instead, it seeks to
demonstrate that despite rhetoric to the opposite, practices
related to standards of ‘civilization’ do exist and apply in
the relations between states thereby creating hierarchies
among them: ‘civilizers’ and ‘civilizees’; ‘teachers’ and
‘pupils’.
Adam Watson has argued that during the Cold War, the
Soviet Union and its allies, on the one side, and theWest, on
the other, constituted two separate international systems
operatingwithin the conﬁnes of a single but rather thin and
heterogeneous global international society (Watson, 1992:
290). The end of the Cold War meant, among other things,
that for the ﬁrst time since 1945 the international society
could become politically more homogeneous; an idea that
was initially reﬂected in President George Bush's notion of
a ‘newworld order’ or the concept of ‘world community’ as
it was later deﬁned by President Clinton. The end of the
Cold War also meant that certain norms and standards of
behaviour associated with the West slowly became the
determinants of inter-state relations in the post-Cold Warinternational society. In this context, the pressures of in-
ternational anarchy in conjunction with power asymme-
tries forced Russia to turn to the West for assistance and at
the same time allowed the West to superimpose standards
of behaviour upon Russia. Consequently, the chief objective
of the Russian foreign policy following the end of the Cold
War became the integration of the country into the West-
ern dominated community of states (Porter, 1992). Indeed,
in his report to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federa-
tion in the beginning of 1992, President Yeltsin stated that
one of the fundamental principles of his foreign policy was
the integration of Russia into the ‘community of civilized
states’ (International Herald Tribune, 3 February 1992).
In response to Russian governmental efforts aimed at
domestic political and economic transformation, as well as
altering the way in which the country was to conduct its
foreign affairs, at the end of the G7 summit at Naples, on 10
July 1994, President Clinton announced the entry of Russia
into the ‘world community’ (Associated Press, 11 July 1994).
This paper seeks to examine the process of Russia's inte-
gration into the post-Cold War international society and
investigate the role that the establishment of liberal de-
mocracy and market economy in Russia, as well as the way
inwhich the Kremlin conducted its foreign relations played
in this process.
But before we proceed with this analysis, some clariﬁ-
cations are required. First, it is not the purpose of the paper
to provide a detailed account of the political and economic
developments and debates in Russia in the period under
examination. Its purpose is rather to identify what theWest
required from Kremlin in order for Russia to be admitted to
the ‘community of civilized states’ and how Russia
responded. This is partly the reason for which Russian
sources have not been used. Second, although the sources
are mostly English-language secondary accounts and
newspapers published in the West this does not take value
away from the paper since its focus is on the Western
discourse and practices pertaining to ‘civilized states’,
which is also an international discourse.
2. Standards of ‘civilization’ and international society
The ﬁrst global application of international norms and
expected standards of behaviour took place during the
nineteenth century when the standard of ‘civilization’
applied to the relations between European and non-
European political communities (Bull & Watson, 1984;
Stivachtis, 1998; Watson, 1992). Before the European
expansion, the world comprised several regional interna-
tional societies that were all built upon elaborate civiliza-
tions, including distinctive religions, different systems of
governance, different types of law, and different concep-
tions of the world and ways in conducting relations
(Alexandrowicz, 1967). Consequently, relations between
political entities that were members of different regional
international societies could not be conducted on the same
moral and legal basis as relations within the same society
because the rules of each individual regional society were
culturally particular and exclusive. It was the European
international society, which expanded gradually and
brought other regional international systems/societies into
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1992). In doing so, the European international society was
superimposed on regional international societies, thereby
unifying the world politically, economically, and techno-
logically. Moreover, it was the rules and institutions of the
European international society that were eventually
accepted in principle by the non-European states.
In the process of European expansion, non-European
‘others’, such as Russia, played a decisive role in the evo-
lution of European identity. As the sense of the speciﬁcally
European character of the society of states increased, so did
the sense of its cultural differentiation from what existed
beyond itself. International society came to be regarded as a
privileged association of European and ‘civilized’ states
which had visible expression in certain international in-
stitutions such as international law, diplomacy and the
balance of power, but also in the way that their domestic
politics were conducted (Bull, Kingsbury and Roberts, 1990:
82). Nineteenth century international lawyers perpetuated
the cultural duality between European and non-Europeans,
and between ‘civilized’ and ‘non-civilized’ peoples (Hall,
1884; Lorimer, 1880; Wheaton, 1836). The distinction be-
tween ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ humanity meant that
states belonging to either categories were accorded
different stages of legal recognition. This also implied that
political communities which could not satisfy the neces-
sary political criteria to be sovereign states could not, by the
same token, be members of international society.
In the course of the nineteenth century, as European
international society spread over the world, Asian and Af-
rican political communities were brought within the con-
ﬁnes of the expanding European international system.
Many non-European states sought to join international
society, not only in order to be treated as equals, but also to
strengthen their voice in international affairs. In this pro-
cess, the European states had to deﬁne the conditions
under which they would admit non-European political
communities to the international society they formed
themselves. As a result, political communities, which
aspired to membership of the European international so-
ciety had to meet the standard of ‘civilization’. Those who
would fulﬁl the requirements set by the European states
were brought inside, while those, which would not
conform, were left outside (Schwartzenberger, 1955). Non-
European states had to learn to adjust themselves to new
realities, even at some cost to their own societies.
According to Gerritt Gong (1984: 14e15), the standard
of ‘civilization’ evolved to include the following political
and economic requirements:
 a ‘civilized’ state guarantees basic rights, such as life,
dignity, and property; freedom of travel, commerce, and
religion, especially that of foreign nationals;
 a ‘civilized’ state exists as an organized political bu-
reaucracy with some efﬁciency in running the state
machinery, and with some capacity to organize for self-
defense;
 a ‘civilized’ state adheres to generally accepted inter-
national law, including the laws of war; it also maintains
a domestic system of courts, codes, and published lawswhich guarantee legal justice for all within its jurisdic-
tion, foreigners and native citizens alike;
 a ‘civilized’ state fulﬁls the obligations of the interna-
tional system by maintaining adequate and permanent
avenues for diplomatic interchange and communica-
tion; and
 a ‘civilized’ state by and large conforms to the accepted
norms and practices of the ‘civilized’ international
society.
The standard of ‘civilization’ reﬂected the norms of the
liberal European civilization (Tucker, 1970: 9), as well as a
continuing process, which tended to lead to greater ho-
mogeneity among states (Lauterpacht, 1947;
Schwartzenberger, 1966). In other words, the purpose of
the standard of ‘civilization’ was to create ‘like states’
operating within a liberal international order.
It is worth noting that since the establishment of the
European international society, the relationship between
the European powers and Russia has been rather ambiva-
lent. Although Russia was an essential participant in the
European states system and contributed to the functions of
institutions like international law, diplomacy and the bal-
ance of power, the country was conﬁned to the margins of
the European international society. This trend was rein-
forced following the October 1917 Revolution and
continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
end of the socialist regime.
In the post-colonial era, the standard of ‘civilization’
came to be viewed as part of an unjust system of domina-
tion and exploitation, and was perceived as denying equal
rights to the political communities of Africa, Asia and
Oceania, whose fate was either to become colonies of the
European imperial powers or to be assigned a subordinate
form of independence. The standard of ‘civilization’ was
insulting to representatives of non-European countries as
the privileged legal status which European states claimed
for themselves invited abuses and led to campaigns for its
abolition.
While the old standard of ‘civilization’ fell into disre-
pute, new possible successors have risen in contemporary
international society (Bowden, 2004, 2009; Browlie, 1979;
Donnelly, 1998; Fidler, 2000, 2001; Mozaffari, 2001). This
situation became clearer in the period following the end of
the Cold War. For example, David Fidler (2001: 147) sug-
gests that with the end of the ColdWar, liberalism emerged
victorious and that “no non-western culture is universal-
izable like liberalism.” As a result, scholars have argued that
the world is divided into liberal and non-liberal zones.
According to Benedict Kingsbury (1999: 90), the liberal
zone consists of “liberal states practicing a higher degree of
legal civilization, to which other states will be admitted
only when they meet the required standards” and that “the
liberal West as the vanguard of a transformed legal global
order contains a new standard of ‘civilization’ … to pro-
mote the advancement of the backward.”
Yannis Stivachtis (2010, 2008 and 2006) has argued that
the standard of ‘political’ and ‘economic performance’,
associated with liberal democracy and market economy
respectively, have become the standards of ‘civilization’ in
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2014). This development has been strengthened by the
emergence of an international norm that considers de-
mocracy spreading to be an accepted and necessary
component of international behaviour (Franck, 1994; 1995;
Hobson, 2008; Morphet, 2005). Moreover, democracy has
been viewed as the product of the development of the
capitalist state and its spread as an imperative for the
spread of the capitalist system (King & Kendall, 2004).
‘Economic performance’ is closely tied to ‘political per-
formance’ and ‘good governance’ and ﬁgures prominently
in the policies of global and regional organizations, which
provide a powerful incentive for aspiring members or
assistance seekers to rethink their domestic political and
economic arrangements by making democracy and market
liberalization a precondition for membership or assistance
(Bowden & Seabrooke, 2006). Moreover, what the greatest
majority of international organizations have in common is
their tendency to promote a liberal international order. One
may observe that what the standards of ‘political’ and
‘economic performance’, on the one hand, and the histor-
ical standard of ‘civilization’, on the other, have in common
is their tendency to create and support an international
liberal political and economic system. Therefore, it is not a
coincidence that requirements included in the historical
standard of ‘civilization’ are also included in today's policies
associated with ‘political’ and ‘economic conditionality’.
3. The post-Cold War international society
As Adam Watson suggested, the Cold War global inter-
national society was bipolar in structure with the United
States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies
constituting the two main pillars (Watson, 1992: 290). The
world, however, remained formally one international so-
ciety, with a common structure of international law,
diplomatic representation and other rules and institutions
inherited from European international society.
During the Cold War, global institutions, like the IMF
and GATT, and regional organizations, such as the EU/EEC
and NATO, were viewed as clubs formed by and for liberal
states. Consequently, the capitalist system was conﬁned to
a limited geographical space. The collapse of the Soviet
Union, the end of communist regimes in Eastern Europe,
the decline of communist ideology in general, and the
request for membership for the above indicated organiza-
tions by former communist countries paved the way for the
expansion of the capitalist system. Consequently, organi-
zational membership or assistance came to be dependent
on the adoption of politicaledemocratic and economic
conditions by candidate or assistance-seeking states. It has
been the implementation of these standards that have
contributed to the expansion of the capitalist system and
the liberal political and economic order associated with it.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the decline of the
communist ideology were viewed as the triumph of civili-
zation over totalitarianism (Fukuyama, 1992). Practitioners
and international institutions did not stay behind. Presi-
dent George Bush Senior called for a ‘new world order’
based on democratic states, (U.N. General Assembly, 1
October 1990) while President Yeltsin was quick toreciprocate by declaring that Russia should become a
democratic state in order to join the ‘community of civi-
lized states’ (Timmermann, 1992). Furthermore, the G-7
made the promotion of democracy a key feature of its
blueprint for a twenty-ﬁrst century peace. Consequently,
the democratization of the ‘barbarians’ (former communist
and post-Soviet states) became an accepted and necessary
component of international behaviour. Moreover, peace,
stability and predictability in international relations could
only be achieved through the democratization of the non-
democratic ‘other’.
The collapse of the Soviet Union not only meant the end
of the bipolar structure of international society but also the
need for Russia to re-deﬁne its role and position in world
affairs. It was in this context and due to the pressures of
international anarchy that a weak Russia saw its re-
integration into post-Cold War politics through its inte-
gration into the ‘community of civilized states’.
When President Yeltsin spoke about the ‘community of
civilized states’, what he had in his mind was “the West
that was broadly deﬁned in terms of the whole Atlantic-
European region” (Timmermann, 1992: 163) Yeltsin's
‘community of civilized states’ echoed that of ‘world com-
munity’ that President Clinton used to refer to all these
states that have democratically elected governments,
respect human rights and pursue economic policies asso-
ciated with free market economy.
That was not a new rhetoric as just before President
Clinton, President George Bush had also proclaimed his
hope for a new world order as
“… a partnership of nations that transcends the Cold
War. A partnership based on consultation, cooperation,
and collective action, especially through international
and regional organizations. A partnership united by
principle and the rule of law and supported by an
equitable sharing of both cost and commitment. A
partnership whose goals are to increase democracy,
increase prosperity, increase the peace, and reduce
arms.” (UN General Assembly, 1 October 1990)
For President Clinton, the newworld that camewith the
end of the Cold War was facing a contest
“… as old as history. A struggle between freedom and
tyranny, between tolerance and bigotry; between
knowledge and ignorance; between openness and
isolation … between hope and fear”. Under such cir-
cumstances, President Clinton argued that the sacred
mission of the humanity is “to build a new world …
more democratic, more prosperous, more free of ancient
hatreds andmodernmeans of destruction.” (UNGeneral
Assembly, 26 September 1994).
According to President Clinton, states should pursue
policies of “free markets and economic justice”; observe
“the values of tolerance and liberty and civil society”, and
their purposes “must be consistent with freedom and their
practices consistent with international law.” (UN General
Assembly, 26 September 1994). He ﬁnalised the framework
of the ‘world community’ by resorting to the Kantian logic
that “democracies are more likely to be stable and less
likely to wage war. They strengthen civil society and they
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nities … Our efforts to help build more democracies will
make us more secure, more prosperous and more suc-
cessful.” (UN General Assembly, 26 September 1994).
Consequently, President Clinton identiﬁed it as his main
objective to pursue a policy of ‘enlarging democracy’; that
was “to expand and strengthen the world's community of
market-based democracies” (UN General Assembly, 26
September 1994). Moreover, President Clinton declared
that
“During the Cold War we sought to contain a threat to
survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge the
circle of nations that live under those free institutions,
for our dream is of a day when opinions and energies of
every person in the world will be given full expression
in a world of thriving democracies that cooperate with
each other and live in peace.” (UN General Assembly, 27
September 1993).
What President Clinton proclaimed was a policy aiming
mainly at the integration of the ex-communist states into
the ‘world’. Any of these states that could be committed to
the same norms and principles that the Western de-
mocracies shared could gain its entry into the ‘world
community’. Russia itself made its admission into the
‘community of civilized states’ its ﬁrst priority.4. Russia's motives for integration into the
‘community of civilized states’
Russia's motives for integration into the ‘community of
civilized states’ were purely strategic. By taking over the
Soviet seat at the UN Security Council and claiming the sole
right to control the nuclear weapons, the Russian leader-
ship made it clear from the outset that it wished to main-
tain Russia's great power status. On the other hand, Russia
was facing signiﬁcant domestic problems, which could
jeopardise its international power status. Under the new
conditions, if Russia wished to escape from the political,
social, and economic crisis it ought to avoid isolation.
Additionally, with the end of the Cold War and the decline
of military power, economic power became the principal
component of states' strength. The Russian leadership un-
derstood well that in the new international environment
even the strongest military power could be marginalised
unless it had adequate relations with the major economic
powers. The states that were powerful economically, ac-
cording to Yeltsin's reasoning, would dominate the world
arena politically. If Russia wished to remain a great power
and to respond to the responsibilities of its status, it should
develop economically. Yet this development could not be
based exclusively on Russian efforts, since Russia was
economically exhausted, but also on the ﬁnancial aid from
abroad. Because Russia desperately needed economic aid
from theWest, it should, in return, abandon its old policies.
Russia will try “to secure maximum outside support for
its internal transformation”, Yeltsin declared.
“Russia will be able to become a modern civilized state
only if it overcomes the isolation the country and its
society ﬁnd themselves and by developing adequatecontacts with the international state community …
Russia and other states having given up their totalitarian
illusions the basis has been created for building conﬁ-
dence between the peoples and setting up relations of
partnership” (International Herald Tribune, 3 February
1992).
President Yeltsin's reasoning was clear: in order to sta-
bilise and rehabilitate the economy and carry out its in-
ternal reforms successfully, Russia urgently needed
material help and know-how from abroad. That meant that
links with the G-7 were essential since those countries
were controlling the most important international eco-
nomic and ﬁnancial institutions, such as the IMF, theWorld
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD). It became therefore imperative for
Russia to join the G-7 in order to maintain its power status
(Smyser, 1993: 15). As Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian Foreign
Minister, put it, “with its huge natural, human, and scien-
tiﬁceeconomic resources, Russia possesses everything
necessary to join the club of the world's most developed
states as a worthy great power” (cited in Timmermann,
1992: 175).
If Yeltsin was the leader who developed this policy,
President Mikhail Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister
Edward Shevardnatze were those who ﬁrst captured and
put it in motion. It is worth mentioning that Gorbachev, in
search of ‘a strategic partnership with the West’, had made
signiﬁcant efforts to gain the Soviet Union a seat at the G-7
summits (Timmermann,1992: 176). But his effortsmet only
little success due to his failure to present a plan that could
lead the USSR out of the crisis. Yeltsin's policy was the
continuation of the GorbacheveSheyardnatze line of ‘new
thinking’ in handling international relations. According to
Gorbatchev (1987), the use of military power and geopo-
litical expansionism were outdated forms of international
conduct, which also imposed considerable costs and
certain barriers to the domestic socio-economic develop-
ment. For Gorbachev, status and power in world affairs
were determined by qualitative indicators, such as eco-
nomic efﬁciency and scientiﬁc and technological progress,
while the internal resources of a state, such as the educa-
tion and technical skills of its population as well as its
quality and way of life, were signiﬁcant factors in interna-
tional inﬂuence. He saw national interests as being better
promoted through multilateral approaches and participa-
tion in international organisations, while the process of
international integration was seen the solution to the
increasing threats of nationalism and religious fundamen-
talism. Finally, the main actors and factors of stability in the
international system were, according to Gorbachev, the
industrialised countries, which adhere to a common sys-
tem of values, laws and norms.
Under the existing conditions, President Yeltsin un-
derstood well the utility of Gorbachev's reasoning and
followed it. By seeking to integrate Russia into the com-
munity of the most advanced industrial states, President
Yeltsin sought to achieve three objectives. First, he inten-
ded to maintain Russia's status and prestige as a great
power. Russia as a member of the ‘community of civilized
states’ could still play an important role in world affairs
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the international position of the country. Second, Yeltsin
sought to increase the future capabilities of Russia by
developing the country economically. As a member of the
‘community of civilized states’, Russia could extract from
them the largest aid possible for its economic recovery
and development. Third, to assure his political future,
President Yeltsin should succeed in his political and eco-
nomic reform programme. Without the assistance of the
West, this success was in doubt and his programme in
jeopardy. But if Russia needed the West, the West needed
Russia too.
5. The Western need for a new Russia
The end of the Cold war produced an even greater
temptation than the two World Wars did to recast the in-
ternational environment in U.S.’ image. But for the U.S.
Government, the ‘new world order’ was to serve not only
the American ideals but also the American needs. President
Clinton declared that his ﬁrst priority was to solve the
American economic problems. With an unstable interna-
tional environment the achievement of this objective was
at stake. This is because international instability leads to
insecurity and insecurity leads to the increase of military
expenditures. If President Clinton wished to succeed to his
economic programme, he should keep the military ex-
penditures at a low level. Thus President Clinton favoured a
stable international environment that could limit the
American insecurity. Therefore the normalisation of the
Russian-U.S. relations became his ﬁrst foreign policy pri-
ority (Talbott, 1992).
If a stable international environment suited best to the
American interests so did to the European Union (EU) and
Japan. Both actors were economic rather than military
powers and if they wished to increase their role in world
politics, they should contribute to its stabilisation. Their
reasoning was simple: in a world characterised by a Cold
War-like hostility, their military capability to resist a po-
tential Russian threat was minimal. In this case, their
dependence on the U.S. could increase substantially and
their inﬂuence over international politics could decrease
signiﬁcantly. Therefore, only a stable international envi-
ronment could serve best their political and economic in-
terests. Thus the North Atlantic Community and Japan had
an interest in common: to contribute to the stabilisation of
the post-ColdWar international environment (Rogov,1992:
15). Western policy was thus based on the premise that
peace and stability can be ensured by a Russia tempered by
democracy and concentrating its energies on developing a
market economy. In this light, the Western principal task
was to assist the Russian reformers. Thus integrating Russia
into the new international system became a key task of the
emerging international order.
The West also sought to inﬂuence Russian attitudes and
affect its calculations. There was a general consensus in
Western cabinets that economic assistance and technical
advice was necessary to ease the pains of transition in
Russia, and that the latter should be welcomed in inter-
national or regional institutions that foster economic, cul-
tural and political co-operation (Miurin & Sommarivy,1994). Therefore, if they wished to see a democratic
regime governed Russia and bringing alterations to its do-
mestic economic and political system as well as changes in
the conduct of its foreign policy, no other solution was
regarded viable than to assist the reforms of President
Yeltsin, who was the ﬁrst democratically elected Head of
State in the Russian history.
Not surprisingly, the Russian politics came at the centre
of the 1992 American presidential elections campaign. A
subject that was widely debated during this campaign was
that of the economic aid. The debate was intense and
controversial, since a large American economic aid to
Russia to assist the reform process was seen as a new
Marshall Plan (Cox, 1994). It appears that the U.S. leader-
ship was afraid that the Russians will use this aid for pur-
poses different than those expected, and then will turn
against the U.S. as the Stalinist Soviet Union did after it
received a great amount of economic aid from the U.S. in
the aftermath of the Second World War. President George
Bush's response, therefore, was that such aid would not be
forthcoming until Russia had undertaken serious reform
itself (Patterson, 1993: 181).
President Clinton, on the other hand, did not commit
himself to any large scale aid programme. Instead he made
clear that he wished to offer a strong backing to Yeltsin. In
any case, Russia came to the core of President Clinton's
foreign and security policy. Warren Christopher, the U.S.
Secretary of State, soon after President Clinton's inaugura-
tion, declared that the Russian-U.S. relations were “the
most important to the long-term security of the United
States” (Christopher, 1993a). Strobe Talbott, the new
American ambassador to Moscow, also stated that “the
United States had to abandon the restraint it had previously
shown, increase its stake in Russian reform and hope that
this would make the reform process irreversible. There
really was no alternative” (Talbott, 1993). Warren Christo-
pher also linked the success of the Russian reform process
to the American security. He argued that the achievement
of the American goals in the post-Cold War era was
depended upon the developments in Russia.
“If Russian democracy collapsed the United States
would face a very insecure future indeedwith the strong
possibility of a renewed nuclear threat, higher defence
budgets, spreading instability, the loss of new markets
and a devastating setback for the world-wide demo-
cratic movement. Engaging with reform was therefore
not only in Russia's interest, it was in the American in-
terest as well” (Christopher, 1993b)
President Clinton had many reasons for being involved
with Russian reforms. First, without decisive Western help,
Russian reforms could fail and thus cause unpredictable
consequences for the ‘new world order’. In Clinton's
reasoning, Washington could be active not only by sup-
plying the necessary reforms material but also by mobi-
lising international support for the latter. This is what he
tried to do at the emergency G-7 meeting in April 1993.
Additionally, President Clinton sought to convince the in-
ternational economic institutions to be more sympathetic
to Russia’ needs. At the same time he sought to encourage
privatisation in Russia by offering advice and training
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American investment in Russia.
A second reason was to minimise the threats coming
from the transformation of the Russian system. Thus the
American administration intended to encourage the
development of strong bonds between Russia and the
new independent states. If the relations among these
states were stable then international stability could also
be served. Otherwise, potential conﬂicts could undermine
world peace since some of those states were holders of
nuclear arms. Therefore, a third reason engaging with
Russian reform was the need for the U.S. to prevent or
control the spread of nuclear weapons after the break-up
of the Soviet Union (Cox, 1994: 645). Finally, another
important reason for establishing strong links with Russia
was related to the issue of ‘new world order’. Russia, being
a military superpower, remained a force that the U.S.
could not ignore. Without Russia's help no major peace
settlement could have occurred such as those in South
Africa or in the Middle East. Russia's ability to inﬂuence
international affairs made it attractive to the American
administration which desired to reduce its overseas
commitments and share the burden of world order with
other major powers. An integrated Russia could serve ﬁrst,
as a barrier to the potential national ambitions in the
Eurasian region; second, as a barrier to the spread of Is-
lamic fundamentalism; and third, as an international
stabiliser. Therefore, both the U.S. and Russia had an in-
terest in engaging with the Russian reform process. But
American support was not enough for President Clinton's
foreign policy. The U.S. had to go beyond and to establish a
‘strategic alliance’; a doctrine that was later transformed
to the policy of the ‘new democratic partnership’ (Clinton,
1993a; 1993b).
6. The standards of the ‘world community’
If Russia wished to join the ‘community of civilized
states’ in order to overcome its crisis and develop, it was
necessary to subscribe to the basic norms and principles of
the West and to fulﬁl the standards set by its members
(Corington & Lough, 1992). Russia had to fulﬁl three stan-
dards: ﬁrst, it should democratise its political system;
second, it should foster economic transformation by
establishing a free market economy; and third, it should
alter the way in which Kremlin used to conduct its foreign
relations (Belyaeva, 1993; Lapshin, 1991; Leitzel, 1995).
6.1. Democratisation of the Russian political system
The democratisation of Russia represented a painful
process, which started immediately after the collapse of the
August 1991 coup d’ etat. In early November 1991 a new
government was formed, with President Yeltsin himself
taking the ofﬁce of Prime Minister. Also in early November
Yeltsin announced that the Communist Party was banned
and that its property was transferred to the state. The Fifth
Congress of the People's Deputies granted President Yeltsin
special powers for a period of one year. At the same time
new political parties were formed. On November 30, the
Constitutional Court accepted the ban of the CommunistParty and the transfer of its property to the state but
announced that the ban of its local branches was uncon-
stitutional. The decision was widely viewed as a compro-
mise between President Yeltsin and Communist groups,
which immediately announced that they would attempt
the re-establishment of a Soviet Communist Party. At the
same time, the decision of the Constitutional Court invited
the conﬂict between the executive and the legislature.
Until December 1993, Russia's fundamental political
problemwas associatedwith the Soviet constitution, which
declared the Soviet parliament sovereign (Ashlud, 1994:
58e59). The old Supreme Soviet took its sovereignty and
supremacy seriously, trying to exercise both executive and
judicial power. Threats of conﬂict between the executive
and legislature bodies were temporarily defused by a
compromise agreement between President Yeltsin and
Khasbulatov, the President of the Parliament, which
envisaged that a draft constitution would be voted on in a
referendum in April 1993, while all constitutional amend-
ments adopted at the Congress (which aimed to limit the
powers of the President) would be suspended. President
Yeltsin's special powers to rule by decree, which were due
to expire in December, were to be retained until the time of
the referendum.
In February 1993 negotiations between Yeltsin and
Khasbulatov failed to achieve a settlement of the consti-
tutional dispute. The Eighth Congress voted to annul the
constitutional compromise adopted at the Seventh
Congress in December 1992, and deprived President Yeltsin
of the special powers. The Congress also rejected the pro-
posed referendum on the respective roles of President and
legislature. In response, on March 20, President Yeltsin
announced that he intended to rule the country by decree
until the referendum and that the decisions of the Supreme
Soviet and Congress would have no legal force in the
interim period. The Supreme Soviet and the Constitutional
Court responded negatively to Yeltsin's announcement and
imposed additional four questions at the forthcoming ref-
erendum which appeared to reduce the likelihood that
President Yeltsin would achieve high level of public
support.
The referendum took place on 25 April 1993 and 57.4%
of the voters expressed their conﬁdence to President Yelt-
sin, whilst 53.7% accepted his socio-economic programme.
Support for early Presidential elections was relatively low
(49.1%) but there was much greater enthusiasm for early
elections for a new State Duma (70.6%) (Ashlud, 1994: 60).
The latter took place in December 1993 and to the surprise
of the West the majority of the new Congress was
belonging to the Communists and Nationalists. But before
the December elections, another domestic upheaval
occurred. Due to the growing opposition from the Russian
Parliament, President Yeltsin decided to suspend its func-
tions until the elections take place.
This decision invited the reaction of anti-Yeltsin political
forces, which under the leadership of Rutskoi and Khas-
bulatov occupied the Russian Parliament in late September
1993. This opposition movement was suppressed by the
military forces few days afterwards and the leaders of the
campaignwere imprisoned. However, in 1994 both Rutskoi
and Khasbulatov were set free because President Yeltsin
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President Yeltsin from barring Rutskoi's movement from
running in the December election.
Together with the parliamentary elections, President
Yeltsin asked the Russian population to vote for the
acceptance of a new Russian constitution that was to
replace the old Soviet one. In December 1993, the Russian
voters ended the anomalous constitutional question by
adopting a new constitution. Based on the French consti-
tution, it provided for a parliamentary system with an or-
dinary division of power between a strong executive and a
parliament reduced to a legislative role. Parliamentary
elections and the adoption of a new constitution through a
referendum were “acts of nation-building that reinforced
Russia's legitimacy” (Ashlud, 1994: 60).
Until the mid-1994 much of the necessary political
transformation was accomplished. Basic political in-
stitutions, such as an elected president, an elected parlia-
ment structured by political parties and a Western-type
constitution already existed. The freedom of press was
assured and the basic human rights were observed
(Murray, 1994). With the democratisation process at stage,
Russia was in a position to assure the West for its
intentions.
6.2. Establishment of a free-market economy
The economic reform programmewas proved at least as
painful as the process of democratisation and there has
been a heated debate about the signiﬁcance, effectiveness
and ‘appropriateness’ of economic measures taken by
successive Russian governments (Hough, 2001; Glinski &
Reddaway, 1999; Goldman, 1994; Reddaway and Gliski,
2001; Shleifer, 1999). Yet, the economic reform and
democratization processes were strongly linked. The
establishment of a successful free-market economy was
viewed as being depended upon the creation of a multi-
party democratic system according to the Western
archetype.
Russia's inheritance limited opportunities from the
outset. The country suffered severe economic problems in
1991e92 in attempting to effect a transition from a
centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented system.
On 2 January 1992, as part of the new Russian economic
reform programme that had been announced by President
Yeltsin in late October 1991, the government ended state
controls on the prices of most goods, resulting in substan-
tial price increases. Yegor Gaidar, the Finance Minister,
aimed to liberalise most prices, drastically to reduce central
government expenditure in order to attain ﬁnancial sta-
bility, and to achieve lasting structural changes bymeans of
transfer to private ownership of state enterprises. Consid-
erable progress was made in liberalising prices at the cost
of high inﬂation although the failure to increase energy
prices was viewed by some observers as an obstacle to
structural reform. Additionally, some reformers were less
radical than others. The result was that the ﬁrst govern-
ment failed to takemore drastic measures. For example, the
government allowed local authorities to maintain some
control over the prices and resisted full opening to foreign
trade.But how far a can a government go with measures that
could upset a public that had already suffered enough?
President Yeltsin had certainly the mandate of the Russian
people, but as a politician he wished to maintain a balance
between his objectives and the will of the citizens. At the
same time, the constitutional chaos was an additional
barrier to the economic reforms. Russian reformers might
have done more but they did not receive any substantial
ﬁnancial help from outside. With the U.S. absorbed in the
process of Presidential elections, the West had not a con-
crete policy towards Russia. In April 1992, President Bush
announced $24 billion in aid that failed to arrive. Never-
theless, Gaidar managed to cut the monthly inﬂation to 9%
making Russia within striking distance from stability. But
this policy soon invited strong criticism and protests
(Leitzel, 1995).
Opposition to the government's economic policies was
evident in the Sixth Congress held in early April 1992.
Following criticism of its reform programme, the Russian
Government offered its resignation, which was not
accepted by President Yeltsin. He strongly criticised the
Congress for failing to support legislation necessary for the
introduction of a market economy, which, among other
things, was aiming at assuring the West for Russia's in-
tentions and therefore to attract foreign aid which the
Russian economy so desperately needed (Sewell, 1992).
The result of the strong opposition was that the central
government expenditure began to increase from April 1992
onwards, due to the increased credits to industry and the
demands, made by the Supreme Soviet, for extra social
expenditure. On June 1992 President Yeltsin appointed
Yegor Gaidar as acting Prime Minister. This appointment
was widely regarded as an important victory for advocates
of radical economic reform. Also in June, the Supreme So-
viet adopted legislation permitting large-scale privatisation
and a presidential decree introduced, for ﬁrst time, bank-
ruptcy regulations. But more extreme opposition to the
economic reform programme appeared soon coming from
industrial bosses who launched their own political party
the ‘Civic Union’. Western aid could have helped Gaidar
soften the impact of his policies, but the IMF loan had not
been signed yet. Without any help from abroad, Gaidar
faced a dangerous confrontation with the industrialists'
lobby in parliament.
Controversy regarding economic policy continued in
July 1992, with the resignation of the Chairman of the
Central Bank, Georky Matyukhin, who was severely criti-
cised for his liberal monetary policies and who was
replaced by Viktor Geraschenko. The appointment of
Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister led to new expectations.
Moreover, Boris Federov, a liberal economist, was appoin-
ted as Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for the
economy. Shortly after his appointment, Chernomyrdin
announced a plan to stabilise prices by limiting the levels of
proﬁts, but in January 1993 this plan was deemed ‘un-
workable’ and was abandoned after strong opposition from
Federov. By taking ambivalent positions, President Yeltsin
did not provide the adequate support to the reformers.
Instead of putting himself in the forefront of reforms, as
initially intended to do, he reacted to parliament's attacks
by trying to stay above and beyond the conﬂicts and
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attempted to bypass parliament by setting rival centres of
power and increasing his own authority. The result was a
political deadlock among president, parliament, govern-
ment and central bank. Under such circumstances no eco-
nomic programme could produce concrete results.
In January 1993, President Yeltsin sought to reassert
himself for asking a vote of conﬁdencewith the referendum
of April 25th. The results of the referendum gave new
conﬁdence to President Yeltsin and enabled him to alter the
balance of power within the government against the con-
servatives. At the same time, the G-7 promised a second aid
package of $28 billion. The IMF also sent a loan of $670
million. Despite Fedorov's efforts, Russia was missing the
targets set by the IMF. The essence is that the IMF could
only be expected to support effective economic policies, but
such policies were incompatible with the monetary policy
of Geraschenko which led to the increasing of inﬂation. It
was at this critical point that the aid should have come from
the G-7 but for various reasons, it did not. Most of the
countries were in recession. Germany was unwilling to pay
more for the Russian reconstruction and Japan was
involved in a conﬂict with Russia concerning the Kurile
Islands. Additionally, the domestic politics made the re-
forms impossible. Parliament continued to vote for open-
ended spending and forced a political crisis by debating
Yeltsin's powers and by proposing a budget which, if
adopted, could lead to hyperinﬂation.
On 2 September 1993, President Yeltsin announced the
dissolution of parliament and declared new parliamentary
elections. The emergence of Zhirinovsky's power invited
new thinking. The latter's core support came from those
affected negatively from economic reform. However, the
anti-reform mood soon reversed as a result of a monetary
crisis. Actually, the national currency appeared very strong
on the free exchange market and inﬂation rose. Simulta-
neously, the West reacted with disappointment and
concern. As a result of this reaction, governmental policies
immediately changed. Chernomyrdin refused new expen-
ditures and Federov's ﬁnancial and monetary stabilisation
programme continued. Although the Russian militar-
yeindustrial complex demanded the increase of the
defence expenditure, Chernomyrdin did not give up to
these demands. According to Anders Ashlud (1994: 65),
Russia had accomplished a great deal. Having created the
fundamental political and economic institutions and pur-
suing effective policies, Russia managed in the mid-1994 to
be at the door of the ‘community of civilized states’. But the
opening of the door and the welcome greetings were also
dependent on the nature of its foreign policy.
6.3. A new foreign policy
If democratisation and economic reform proved to be a
painful process, the new foreign policy was a rather
complicated issue mainly due to two factors. First, a new
foreign policy required principles with which Russia was
unfamiliar since its foundation. Tolerance and peaceful
coexistence should now replace the old pattern of superi-
oreinferior relations between Russia and those territories
that were previously belonged to the Soviet Union or withthe states with which the latter had direct political links.
Second, there were two contradictory perceptions con-
cerning the orientation of the Russian foreign policy. On the
one hand, President Yeltsin and the ‘national democrats’
wished Russia to be integrated into the ‘community of
civilized states’. On the other hand, the ‘national patriots’
argued that Russia should play a dominant role within the
Commonwealth of Independent States and maintain a
speciﬁc identity vis-a-vis the West. This duality existed
even within the Russian government (Porter & Saivetz,
1994). The search for a new identity returned to the clas-
sical dual scheme of ‘Westernisers’ and ‘Slavophiles’ with
the former insisting that Russia should join the European
integration and the latter arguing that the country should
be a ‘Euro-Asian’ power and bridge between Europe and
Asia (Timmermann, 1992: 164e65).
One can distinguish threemajor phases in the post-1990
Russian foreign policy. First, during the period 1990e92
Russia developed a pro-Western foreign policy aiming to its
integration into the ‘community of civilized states’. Second,
from early 1993 to early 1994 Russia sought to re-assert
itself as a great power but without changing its willing-
ness for integration into the ‘world community’. This in-
terval can be characterised as a response by the Russian
leadership to an attempt by conservative forces to regain
power. Finally, from the early months of 1994 Russia's
‘aggressive’mood partly retreated due to themoderation of
the conservative forces stance. This moderation may be
seen as the product of the realisation that any reconstitu-
tion of the Russian empire through political and military
pressures and means would be costly and counter-
productive (Adomeit, 1995: 35).
As far as the Eastern European states were concerned,
Yeltsin's policy aimed at granting to the countries of the ex-
Soviet bloc freedom to choose their own system and
foreign policy orientation. The accomplishment of this
policy was a rather easy task. Domestic changes in these
countries made Russian military presence unwelcome and
involvement in their domestic politics unthinkable. On the
other hand, if Russia wished to gain assistance from the
West, it should not confront the will of the Eastern Euro-
pean states. However, Russian policy towards the former
Soviet Republics was a rather difﬁcult matter (Dawisha &
Parrott, 1994). After having succeeded in breaking away
from the Soviet empire, the new independent states linked
themselves with the pre-Soviet era. Russia's national con-
sciousness, on the other hand, had been centred for so long
on the empire and not on the Russian nation. As one of the
Kozyrev's advisors explained, “there is a psychological
barrier preventing us from treating other CIS members as
absolutely independent” (cited in Timmermann, 1992:
167).
Despite the existing difﬁculties, President Yeltsin sought
to apply a foreign policy aiming at the devolution of power
to the republics. Some of the ﬁrst indications of this
orientation were the conclusion of treaties on inter-state
relations between Russia and Ukraine, Belarus, Latvia,
Estonia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan and Moldova in 1991. The
primary concern of Russia was not only national security
but also the need to assure the 25e30million Russians who
were leaving in the ex-Soviet Republics or inwhat has been
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the statement of Kozyrev according to which, “… no
Russian government could afford to stand aside when
ethnic Russians living in successor states are oppressed or
even driven out. Russia would in accordance with inter-
national law even use force if necessary” (Congress of
Peoples' Deputies of the RSFSR, 4 September 1991).
Yeltsin's ﬁrst approach to the problem was ambiguous.
He agreed to the creation of an economic community,
which was founded by eight republics on 8 October 1991.
Due to a growing opposition to any plan that was aiming to
create a new federation, President Yeltsin submitted him-
self to the idea of a ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’.
The creation of CIS was decided on 8 December 1991 by
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus with the Minsk Agreement.
According to this agreement, the contracting parties agreed
to build
“democratic law-governed states' intending to develop
their relations on the basis of mutual recognition and
respect for state sovereignty, the inalienable right to
self-determination, the principles of equality and non-
interference in internal affairs, repudiation of the use
of force and of economic or any other methods of
coercion, settlement of contentious problems by means
of mediation and other generally-recognised principles
and norms of international law” (Minsk Agreement, 8
December 1991).
Soon other eight republics wished to join. The Alma-Ata
Declaration of 21 December 1991 formally established the
CIS and left out Georgia and the Baltic States. This decla-
ration was a repetition of the principles stated in Minsk
Agreement with an additional clause indicating that “in
order to ensure international strategic stability and secu-
rity, allied command of the military-strategic forces and a
single control over nuclear weapons should be preserved”
(The Europa Yearbook, 1994, Vol. 1: 119). The Alma-Ata
Declaration was followed by the signature of other three
agreements on 30 December 1991 concerning the conduct
of Councils of Heads of States and Governments, strategic
forces and armed forces and border troops.
Relations with the West were further improved in 1991.
The Russian leadership believed that its foreign policy
orientation could succeed only if it directed its attention
towards all the G-7 countries. Thus Russia sought to
develop close relations with each individual country of the
Group. An expression of this orientation is found in the
Russian-British Declaration called ‘Partnership for the
1990s’. Yet Russia sought to cultivate close relations with
Germany, France and Italy. During Yeltsin's visit to Western
capitals, a series of bilateral agreements were signed and
common declarations were issued which were viewed by
Russia as opening the door for full integration into the G-7
(Rakowska-Harmstone, 1994).
Some of the most signiﬁcant indications of the pro-
Western orientation of Russia's foreign policy were the
trips of President Yeltsin to the European Parliament and
Washington as well as the visit of Sergei Stepashin,
Chairman of the Supreme Soviet's Security Committee, to
NATO with the aim to assure the status of observer for
Russia in the Atlantic Alliance. At the same time, GennedyBurbulis, Yeltsin's foreign policy adviser, noted that “none
of the pressing domestic problems of the Russian Federa-
tion can be solved without learning from the European
experience … A revival of Russia is impossible outside the
renewed Europe” (cited in Adomeit, 1995: 43). Bilateral
relations with the Western European states reﬂected also
the Yeltsin's strategy to link Russia with the process of
European integration mobilised to assist Russia's reforms.
As Burbulis said in May 1992, “… a comprehensive treaty
between Russia and the European Community would
determine the fundamental principles of Russia's future
participation in European integration” (International Her-
ald Tribune, 7 May 1992). Indeed, it was the European
members of the G-7 that provided most of the Western aid
to Russia, with Germany playing the leading role.
Moreover, President Yeltsin introduced new policies to
comply better with Western ideas. This involved a radical
reduction of strategic arms to a number far below the limits
set by the START treaty, ratiﬁcation and continuation of the
CSCE treaty on the reduction of conventional armed forces;
a strengthening of the United Nations as an effective in-
strument of mediation and securing peace; a willingness in
the UN context to support sanctions, and to set up a mili-
tary contingent for joint crisis management or even mili-
tary intervention (See Kozyrev's speech at the UN Human
Rights Committee, 14 February 1992). Furthermore, Yeltsin
sought to pursue a policy of gradual reduction of ideolog-
ically motivated engagement with socialist countries, such
as Cuba, Vietnam, Angola and North Korea, in favour of co-
operationwithWestern-oriented countries as South Africa,
Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and the ‘four tigers’ in South East
Asia. Finally, Russia accepted the idea that under certain
circumstances international community has a legitimate
right to intervene in the internal affairs of its members
through the UN sanctions or CSCE mechanisms.
In view of this reorientation, the West became increas-
ingly willing to support Russia's membership in the IMF
and to invite Yeltsin (as observer) to Munich for the World
Economic Summit in July 1992. Already on 13 April 1992,
Russia and other ten CIS republics had joined EBRD. That
was the ﬁrst of a number of steps that led to the integration
of Russia into the ‘community of civilized states’. In June
1992, Russia was also admitted as a full member to the IMF
andWorld Bank and thus became a partner in international
ﬁnancial relations with a right to participate in all world
economic summits.
At the Washington Summit of June 1992, Yeltsin
declared the immediate goals of the Russian foreign policy.
These included the devolution of the Soviet Union; eradi-
cation of the regional military preponderance; abandon-
ment of military parity; further co-operation in the UN
Security Council; integration in international economic
institutions; and membership in NATO (The New York
Times,17 June 1992). As Kozyrev put it clearly: “… failure to
integrate Russia into the democratic community of states
and thus the world economy would amount to a betrayal of
the nation and the ﬁnal slide of Russia down to the category
of third rank states” (The Economist, 29 January 1994). The
practical expression of this statement was the Russian-
American Agreement, according to which the U.S. and
Russia pledged “… to work together, along with the allies
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global protection system against limited ballistic attack”
(Kozyrev's Address to the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
January 1994). Thus the relations with the West further
improved in 1992 partly prompted by the need for signif-
icant Western economic assistance.
In January 1993, Presidents Yeltsin and Bush signed the
START-II Treaty which envisaged a reduction in the stra-
tegic nuclear arms of both powers to about one-third of
their current level. In March 1993, another important
meeting was held in Vancouver between President Yeltsin
and the newly elected President Clinton. At that meeting,
President Clinton promised an economic assistance to
Russiaworth some $1.6 billion. But this amountwas less aid
than assistance. Nearly half of this money was tied to
Russian purchases of American grain while 15% took the
form of trade credits (Financial Times, 27 March 1993).
Certainly, this assistance had nothing to do with a new
Marshall Plan and President Clintonwas not in a position to
press the Congress for one. What he sought to do instead
was to persuade the IMF countries to provide economic
concessions. Thus individual Western countries decided to
reschedule Russia's foreign debt and the IMF to reduce the
conditions Russia had to fulﬁl in order to get loans.
In April 1993, the countries of G-7 agreed to offer Russia
economic aid and debt-relief. But all these measures were
not revolutionary whilst Clinton had no power to convince
the sceptical Japanese, the over-burdened Germans, and
the IMF to provide greater ﬁnancial assistance for Russia. To
these problems, one needs to add the neo-imperialist
tendencies that re-appeared in Russian foreign policy
with the repetition of the nationalist, pan-Slavist and
Euroasianist rhetorics. The main reasons behind Russia's
new assertiveness appeared to be the slow tempo of the
Russian economic recovery and development and the
disappointment of the public opinion with the reform
programme, which caused major socio-economic prob-
lems. The disappointing developments in the economic
ﬁeld provided the basis on which the opposition forces
built their policy advocating the break-up of relations with
the Western countries and the re-establishment of Russia's
dominance over the CIS states.
The result of December 1993 elections meant that the
majority in the new Russian parliament was belonging to
those opposed to free market economy and pro-Western
foreign policy. Nevertheless, President Clinton did not
abandon his policy. As Talbott (1993) put it, the U.S. had to
remain patient and steady and to continue to work for the
integration of Russia rather than begin planning its
containment. In his own words,
“… a Russia integrated than contained would mean
fewer tax dollars spent on defence; a reduced threat
from weapons of mass destruction; new markets for
American products and a powerful, reliable partner for
diplomacy as well as commerce in the twentieth-ﬁrst
century” (Talbott, 1993).
With his visit to Moscow in January 1994, President
Clinton intended to reassure the reformers of U.S.’ support
and friendship and also spoke about the Russian greatness
and the American recognition of Russia's special role in theworld affairs. Yet, President Clinton launched a more active
policy to draw Russia closer to the West. In March 1994,
after tense negotiations, the IMF approved a $1.5 billion
loan to Moscow (Financial Times, 23 March 1994). This
loan, although was not what exactly Russia wished, served
three purposes. First, it provided the West with continuing
inﬂuence over Russian policy-making; second, it was a kind
of support to Yeltsin and his government; and third, was a
proof that Russia had not abandoned the reform process.
The decision of the West to remain engaged in the
Russian reform was also assisted by the moderate policy of
Russia. As Hannes Adomeit observed, “Moscow did indeed
in several instances act unilaterally, apply militar-
yepolitical pressures and intervene … but even in that
period, the overall character of Russian external policies
were not one of restoration of empire and abandonment of
co-operation with the West” (Adomeit, 1995: 59). Indeed,
these attitudes and policies started weakened from the
early months of 1994. In spite of the existing difﬁculties
Russia contributed considerably to international peace and
security. Particularly, Russia completed the transfer of all
tactical nuclear arsenals from the ex-Soviet Republics
without any problem. This opened the way for the ratiﬁ-
cation and implementation of the START-II agreement. At
the same time, Russia managed to control the illegal trade
of material that can be used for the production of nuclear
weapons by other states and to discourage the participation
of its nuclear scientists in military projects abroad. Yet
Russia contributed to a signiﬁcant reduction of the arma-
ments and armed forces in Europe and simultaneously
reduced the size of its own forces. Last, but not least, the
withdrawal of the Russian troops from the Eastern Europe
and the Baltic states contributed enormously to interna-
tional stability. All these measures highlighted the aware-
ness of the Russian leadership of the costs of imperial
restoration and reﬂected its preference to co-operative
approaches in international affairs (Adomeit, 1995: 66).
7. Russia's entry into the ‘community of civilized
states’
Having assessed the progress of Russia's economic and
political reform programme and foreign policy orientation
and taking into account the political necessity for remain-
ing engaged in the country's transformation, the Western
states were willing in the late spring 1994 to formalise the
entry of Russia into the ‘world community’ (International
Herald Tribune, 13 May 1994). In June, the Russian gov-
ernment decided to commit itself to a formal arrangement
with NATO by participating to the ‘Partnership for Peace’
programme. As Kozyrev put it, Russia
“… intent on co-operating with NATO in a constructive
spirit rather than attempting to play fox in the chicken
coop … Russia stands by its choice of principle the
carrying out of national and state interests through co-
operation rather than confrontation” (International
Herald Tribune, 23 June 1994).
On the other hand, President Clinton tried to ease the
Western worry about Russia's participation to the pro-
gramme by arguing that “… over the long term the move
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way reassure the cast Europeans that they had nothing to
fear from Moscow” (International Herald Tribune, 23 June
1994).
The co-operation agreement between Russia and the
European Union was signed during the Greek Presidency
the day before the European Summit at Corfu. As Leon
Brittan, the European Commissioner, noticed, the agree-
ment was a
“… very ambitious one: partly because it offered Russia
the possibility of a free trade pact with the European
Union; partly because it marked a milestone on the road
towards greater economic and political stability across
the entire continent of Europe; and partly because it
was enacted at almost exactly the same time as Russia
was moving towards signing the Partnership for Peace
… The new trade agreement complements Moscow's
membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace and en-
hances Russia's ties to the West” (International Herald
Tribune, 12 May 1994).
The ﬁnal act of Russia's entry into the ‘world commu-
nity’ took place at Naples in early July where Russia was
invited to attend the G-7 summit having an equal status
with the other states and not being just an observer as it
had happened earlier at Munich. This meeting had to do
less with solving Russia's economic problems and more
with providing the necessary political support for President
Yeltsin to overtake the domestic pressures. As Michael Cox
argues, for Russia “… was important to be there and make
plain its disagreements with the West… This not only sent
a message to domestic critics that Yeltsinwas no mere ‘yes-
man’, but served also to remind the West that in spite of its
economic problems, no major international question could
be resolved without Russia's help” (Cox, 1994: 657). Thus
the G-7 summit was politically symbolic and at the same
time meant the political transformation of G-7 to G-8. In
this way the West reassured Russia that it deserved a place
among the world decision-makers. Finally, on 10 July 1994
President Clinton declared the entry of Russia into the
‘world community’ (International Herald Tribune, 11 July
1994).
8. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was twofold: ﬁrst, to utilize
the theoretical framework of the English School in order to
analyse Russia's relations with theWest from 1991 to 1994;
and second, to provide an empirical contribution to the
literature on international society by highlighting the ex-
istence and applicability of contemporary standards of
‘civilization’, which despite their formal repudiation play a
signiﬁcant role in the post-Cold War international society.
To this end, the paper examined the process of Russia's
integration into the post-Cold War international society
and investigated the role that the establishment of liberal
democracy and market economy and the way in which
Russia conducted its foreign relations all played in this
process.
The study of the evolution of international society
demonstrates that for joining international society statesare required to fulﬁl certain standards. In the process of
European expansion, the standard of ‘civilization’ played an
essential role in determining which states would join the
expanding European society and which ones would not.
Despite the major changes that have occurred, the standard
of ‘civilization’ has remained, albeit under different names,
an international practice as well as a benchmark against
which the attitudes and policies of states are assessed.
Among other things, the end of the ColdWarmeant that
certain norms and standards of behaviour associated with
the West slowly became the determinants of inter-state
relations in the post-Cold War international society. In
this context, the pressures of international anarchy in
conjunction with power asymmetries forced Russia to turn
to theWest for assistance and at the same time allowed the
West to superimpose standards of behaviour upon Russia.
The examination of Russia's entry into the ‘community
of civilized states’ demonstrates six things. First, despite
their formal renunciation, ideas pertaining to civilizations
and standards of ‘civilized’ behaviour continue to create
hierarchies among states and constitute important de-
terminants of interstate relations in contemporary inter-
national society. Second, a comparison between the
process of states admission into the expanding European
international society and the process of Russia's entry into
the ‘community of civilized states’ reveals signiﬁcant sim-
ilarities. Among other things, it makes clear that the
admission process represents interests and needs common
both to the members of the international society and the
candidate states. Third, the Russian case shows that liberal
democracy, market economy, and the conduct of foreign
relations constitute important standards of ‘civilized’
behaviour in post-Cold War international society deter-
mining which states are members of this society and which
are not. Fifth, like in historical cases (i.e. Japan), the entry of
Russia into the ‘community of civilized states’ shows that
under certain circumstances even major powers are
obliged to fulﬁl standards of ‘civilized’ behaviour in order to
join international society thereby achieving their national
interests. Last, but not least, like in all historical cases,
Russia's admission into the ‘community of civilized states’
reveals that in order to join international society states
have to learn to adjust themselves to new realities, despite
domestic political opposition and even at some cost to their
own societies.
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